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Overview 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Western Europe opened the gate for cheap 
and unqualified labor force to rebuild and sustain its economies. For geographical and 
historical reasons, this immigration was provided by underdeveloped Muslim countries. It 
brought a capital gain to Western European economies although it became a complex social 
and urban phenomenon as well. As a matter of fact, a human settlement in a given social 
context creates social and cultural problems that necessitate adapted social policies. The 
situation turned out to be radically alarming for Western European societies because of the 
protests of the third generation. The social gap within Western European societies, as a 
result of liberal and neo-liberal policies, seems unbridgeable. Gradually, the social 
character of the problem of Muslim communities is "veiled" by Media, right wing 
politicians, experts, imams, islamists and veiled young women. In other words, we are 
witnessing an "islamization" of a social conflict as Middle classes in Western Europe are 
going through a serious social downgrading and see immigration as a social stress. 
Social research and surveys show that what many take as granted (that is Islam is the 
primary identity marker of these social groups) can hardly be confirmed. In fact, religiosity 
cannot be separated from dynamics of ethnicity, culture, language, or region. In Western 
European major cities, all these factors converge to make the identity of immigrant Muslim 
communities from southern countries (mainly from Turkey, North and West Africa, or 
South Asia) a multifaceted one. These immigrants settled down either as individuals, 
i families or even as members of an entire village coming together. Therefore, family and 
village of origin, with its complex social networks, is the most fundamental element of their 
identity. Let us also be aware that these groups do not claim Islam as their prior and 
exclusive identity marker. They affirm to be Muslims as long as French autochthones assert 
to be Christian or Jewish (in the case of France) and similarly, if a French declares to be 
French, the immigrant declares himself as an Algerian (in the case of an Algerian). 
In Western Europe, religion and nationality are relational identity markers that depend 
on the context of identification. In certain circumstances, primary identity markers of 
immigrants stick to a certain village (in a given region). In a given context, speaking a 
certain language and belonging to a certain ethnicity (Black, south Asian, Turk, Arab, 
Berber, Kurd...) sharply distinguishes individuals within Muslim communities. In point of 
fact, these features cannot be easily detected for a superficial observer. Thus, Islam in the 
Western European context should be understood as a mixed set of orthodox/popular rituals 
practiced by a given community of a given origin. It is true that Islam is a highly polarizing 
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religion, aiming at structuring the life of individuals and groups according to a covenant, 
nevertheless, this dynamic of polarization is counterbalanced by a strong dynamic of 
fragmentation. Both sorts of dynamics are intrinsic to the agency of these immigrant social 
groups. In their everyday life, they practice and embody Islam in a synthetic and 
fragmented way. 
That being the case, the presence of Muslims in Western Europe, is a socio-cultural 
phenomenon involving highly fragmented and heterogeneous groups that belong to 
different intertwining identities, where Islam is a polarizing element. Further fragmentation 
can be observed due to the fact that these communities are highly mobile. They move 
constantly between cities within a given country, between European cities, between 
European countries and their countries of origin. As a result of continuous brain draining, 
waves of refugees and family reunification, new members come to join the communities. 
The newcomers adapt themselves to the communities and at the same time they transform 
them in many respects. 
As has been highlighted by the recent debate over the integral veil (niqáb/burqa) in 
France and Belgium, Muslim immigrant communities endorse different legal interpretations 
of provisions and religious practices. By the same token, it was an occasion for many 
observers and analysts to notice a fragmented religiosity among Muslims with regard to 
dressing (supposed to be a domain of Islamic law in the Muslim perspective). That 
fragmentation was the main characteristic of religiosity among Muslims in Western Europe, 
has been a known fact for scholars decades ago.1 The fragmentation of the Muslim religious 
field does not mean only a diversity of symbols, customs or rites. Rather, it pinpoints to a 
"fragmentation of authority with a diffused loci of religious authority that offer 
authoritative guidance".2 Taking into account this definition, the fragmentation of the 
Muslim religious field in Western Europe is due to two dynamics. On the one hand, it is an 
effect of a social fragmentation since Muslim immigrant communities are organized around 
families which immigrated to Europe with their different cultural heritages. On the other 
hand, in respect to legal opinions, it is a result of a plurality of religious authorities. 
Increasingly, as has been noted by M. Q. Zaman, "many religious authorities have come 
themselves to explicitly recognize the fragmentation of their authority".3 Granted that in the 
public space, legal pluralism is recognized by religious authorities, one could speak of a 
deliberative religiosity. I mean by this controversial religious practices which become part 
of the public debate and subject of the admitted difference of "authorized" interpretations.4 
I subscribe, here, to deliberative religiosity as framed by Robert Justin Lipkin, who 
1 Salvatore, Armando, "Authority in Question: Secularity, Republicanism and 'Communitarianism' in 
the Emerging Euro-Islamic Public Sphere", Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2007, p. 146. 
2 Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, "Consensus and Religious Authority in Modem Islam: The Discourses 
of the 'Ulamff', in: Speaking for Islam: Religious Authorities in Muslim Societies, Eds. Gudrun 
Krämer, Sabine Schmidtke, Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006, p. 175. 
3 Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, Op. cit., p. 176. 
4 Jean-Paul Chamay has described this pluralistic Muslim legal process as being "une recherche entre 
diverses solutions pour découvrir la plus adéquate au cas concret envisagé. Elle permet aussi la lutte 
dialectique des prétentions opposées qui s'affrontent au cours du litige." See : 
Chamay, Jean-Paul, "Pluralisme normatif et ambigüité dans le Fiqh", Studia Islamica, No. 19, 1963, 
p. 78. 
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understands it as a "non-fundamentalist religious argument that plays a full role in the 
public square".5 
I 
Since their formation, Muslim communities endure an unavoidable secularization. 
Within the walls of the suburbs, these communities fall, unwillingly, into negative 
dynamics of reproduction and communitarianism. Inasmuch as it is an urban phenomenon, 
immigration became a field of opportunities for political parties and especially for 
socialist/leftist tendencies that mostly get their electorate in lower class suburbs. In the so-
called "Glorious Thirty" (1945-1975), the political landscape of Western Europe was 
largely dominated by left wing parties. As a result, immigrants benefited from several 
social programs that improved their conditions of health, employment and accommodation. 
Though left wing parties maintained a long-standing political communication with these 
groups, it was activated only during electoral periods as a bargain. In everyday life, 
politicians were not paying much attention to the social development of the suburbs. 
Facing an increasing economic crisis since the eighties, the right wing parties adopted 
policies of marginalization and exclusion with regard to the descendents of immigrants. 
This leads to concerns of security and radicalism. Instead of handling the causes, right wing 
discourse and policies focus on anxieties and consequences. First, criminality is a social 
consequence of misery, isolation and absence of social policies, like in any urban center all 
over the world. Second, in Western European suburbs, radical Islamism is appealing to few 
people. 
Neither right wing nor left wing parties came to represent Muslim communities in 
Western European democracies. Talal Asad finds the reason of this failure in the following: 
"The ideology of political representation in liberal democracies makes it 
difficult if not impossible to represent Muslims as Muslims because in theory 
the citizens who constitute a democratic state belong to a class that is defined 
only by what is common to all its members and its members only. What is 
common is the abstract equality of individual citizens to one another, so that 
each counts as one".6 
Though it would be unfair to judge the line of reasoning of Asad by the above quoted 
passage, I challenge it with regard to two aspects. On the one hand, most Muslims belong, 
politically and socially speaking, to lower classes whose interests are, traditionally, 
represented by left wing parties. On the other, political parties in liberal democracies do not 
represent individuals but rather class interests according to specific cleavages. In my view, 
the reason why Muslims were not represented in the first generation is that most of them 
were not nationals and therefore they did not vote. Further, immigrants of the same 
5 Lipkin, Robert Justin, "Reconstructing the Public Square", Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 24, No. 5, 
2003, pp. 2082-2086. 
6 Asad, Talal, "Muslims as a "Religious Minority" in Europe, in Talal Asad, Formations of the 
Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 173. 
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generation do not possess any political culture allowing them to have.a political vision or to 
understand their new realities. 
Due to their access to education, many members of the second generation took part in 
local social and cultural associations to help their communities understand laws and 
opportunities allowed by Western European societies. These associations developed into 
unions and organizations, and started to attract the political concern of their countries of 
origin. The latter tried to take advantage from such a prospect in exchange for funding 
mosques and Islamic centers. In particular, North African states and Turkey were attentive 
to prevent the development of any political opposition against their regimes. Gulf States, a 
major provider of funds, accepted to fund only those religious projects that were cautioned 
by conservative religious authorities that were active (or studied) in the Gulf countries. To 
be recommended by such authorities, one has to be a conservative Muslim. Therefore, 
many among the fund hunters understood the chance behind being conservative and took it. 
II 
The lack of political representation of Muslim communities was noticed by the first 
waves of islamists who came to Europe as political refugees fleeing the oppression of Arab 
nationalist regimes. Islamists were able to achieve some gain, setting up several Islamic 
centers and small mosques that played the role of social framing and spiritual guidance. At 
the same time, they failed to have power over the communities the way they aspired to. In 
their countries of origin, most of the islamists belong to lower urban middle classes, they 
are educated and have a clear radical political vision. Conversely, Muslims immigrants 
come from rural groups that are not educated and are attached to their home countries 
where they spend their summer holidays, uphold social ties and own real estate. To secure 
new earned capital, they were not keen to be instrumentalized in a confrontation with their 
countries. Accordingly, these communities were not open for a political Islam as presented 
by the islamists. They wanted an Islam which connects them to what they know the best: 
their homes that are reassuring. To fmd alternative "religious authorities", the Muslim 
communities of Western Europe started importing imams from the rural areas they came 
from. The imported imams are, naturally, educated in a traditional way, without absolutely 
any knowledge of European languages or any urban culture or whatever that can be helpfUl 
in understanding the European context. 
Consequently, these imams failed in helping the Muslim communities understanding the 
social code of Western European societies. For instance, the imported imam of Venissieux 
(Lyon-France) did not know that in Europe, it was a crime for a husband to beat his wife. 
When asked about violence against women he said that according to the Qur'an a husband 
can beat his wife in certain cases. Unsurprisingly, he was expelled, in April 2004, from 
France to Algeria after 25 years of "service", leaving behind his 16 children.7 It is not only 
French authorities who cannot cope with such anachronistic reading of a religious text, but 
also the younger generations within these immigrant communities. First, because there is a 
crack between rural imams and the European education the younger generations received. 
7 See: Cesari, Jocelyne, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United 
States, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 158. 
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Second, the latter face real and daily social challenges that imported imams cannot handle 
in light of their traditional religious knowledge. 
Divided between two cultures, younger generations of Muslims, who were already born 
in Western Europe and who speak European languages as their native languages, are no 
more at ease in this ambiguous condition. Within their families and suburbs they live the 
contradictions of a hollow identity in a fuzzy context. Religiosity and social dynamics 
interact to make the Muslim presence in Western Europe the composite problem it is. In 
this regard, since September 1989, in the media and the public debate, Islam became the 
central identity marker of immigration in Western Europe. This was the case when the 
question of wearing the headscarf in schools developed into a public issue after banning 
three veiled young women from school in France (known as L'affaire de Creil). This was, 
to a certain extent, the act of birth of the affirmative third generation. From the standpoint 
of the French right wing, these veiled girls brought a medieval practice to their schools (and 
societies) which differentiates between them and other pupils on a religious basis. 
Furthermore, the French right wing argued that the veil deforms the public landscape, 
endangers women rights and prevents them from assimilation. In other words, right wing 
discourse requires the veiled girls to hide social differentiation by cultural assimilation. 
From the point of view of the veiled girls, and their communities, the veil is part of the 
Muslim law and as Muslims they are required to respect it. 
I l l 
In order to understand the significance of the headscarf in the public debate on the issue 
of Muslim presence in Western Europe, it is necessary here to rethink about the 
visibility/invisibility link. Women wore the veil, even the integral veil, since the first 
generation. However, women of the first and second generations were not seen or noticed 
when they wore the veil. The places they attended were mostly markets, hospitals and 
parks. They were invisible as long as they were marginal social agents. In any case, these 
women were not asking for a right to the social resources as, in most of the cases, they were 
housewives. For the first generation, wearing the veil was unquestionable since, coming 
from rural areas of their countries of origin, they always did so. For them, it had the 
meaning of a custom rather than a religious sign that distinguishes them from other women. 
In the case of the second generation, the veil became one of the subjects of generational 
conflicts. Usually, girls resist but accept, under pressure, the imposition of the veil by their 
parents. For these women, the veil was a cultural sign of their exclusion from public space. 
Though they wished emancipation, they could not afford the price of leaving their 
communities which, put in its social context, is a risk that most of them did not dare to take. 
Within the Muslim communities, the feminine condition revealed all contradictions of 
patriarchal families. Thus, while parents urged their daughters to enroll in schools in order 
to be educated, they were preparing them for marriage at an early age (as they always did in 
the rural areas). On the other hand, education taught second generation girls equality of 
genders and women rights. Unable to be in command of the situation, parents often sought 
the help of the imams in mosques and Islamic centers to accommodate girls. At a moment 
in secondary school years, parents decide to withdraw girls from school once they make a 
marriage agreement. After marriage, these women became almost inaccessible for social 
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help. They took on, willingly or unwillingly, a baby boom that further complicated the 
social condition of their communities. 
That being the case, when the headmaster of the Gabriel-Havez Middle School in Creil 
excluded three young women on September 18th, 1989, the veil was already a reality in the 
schools since decades. What changed was that among 876 pupils in Gabriel-Havez school, 
500 were Muslims. The young women were expelled "on the grounds that the scarves 
infringed on the laïcité and neutrality of the public school ",8 Indeed, the visibility of these 
young women by the means of the veil was a sign of unease in the French society. It 
pointed out contradictions of both their communities and those of the French society. The 
veil and secularism were used as arms in a social battlefield. Symbols are important and 
effective, especially cultural symbols as they allow to abstract, to manipulate and to cover 
the social conflict. After a long run debate, where the right wing parties were pressing for 
the interdiction of the veil and the left wing was resisting, a law was issued in 2004 
forbidding any visible sign of religious affiliation. More importantly, this debate allowed 
Muslims to be part of the public space, media and intellectual controversy. 
In the 1990s, the question for Western Europeans was not how to "best ensure the 
successful incorporation of Muslims into the values of a liberal democracy" as some argue.9 
On matters of gender, Islam shared the same Judeo-Christian beliefs and practices 
fashioned in an Arabian context. The position with regard to women and their condition is 
sufficiently well known to the European public from the Judeo-Christian treatment of 
women through the medieval and modern European history. It is a position that 
subordinates women to a patriarchal moral and social order. Emancipation of women in 
Western Europe was the result of secularism that broke the above mentioned order. If that 
is the case, the exclusion of veiled girls from schools is a counter-effect of secularism. 
Be that as it may, the debate over the headscarf allowed the inclusion of Muslims, and 
especially of Muslim women into the public deliberation. If we take the latter in the 
meaning of voting, campaigning, letter-writing, pamphleteering10..., then Muslim women 
largely responded to the conditions of political deliberation. As for the outcomes, one must 
admit that deliberation over the veil did not achieve consensus. At least, it showed the 
capacity of Western European societies for inclusiveness of the Muslim minorities. In this 
respect, L. Swaine noted that: 
"Muslims seem to be fully able to take part in democratic deliberation, and 
that they violate no commandments of their faith by so doing"11:.. "Muslim 
minorities support liberty of conscience and religious liberty for all....via 
respectful argumentation and reasoning in public fora and also through the 
examples that they set in public and private life, in their interactions with 
others".12 
8 Bowen, John Richard, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 83. 
9 Swaine, Lucas, "Demanding Deliberation: Political Liberalism and the Inclusion of Islam", Journal 
of Islamic Law and Culture, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, p. 93. 
Swaine, L., Op. cit., p. 94. 
11 Ibid, p. 98. 
]2 Ibid., p. 105. 
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Similarly, A. March compares many Islamic thinkers to theorists of discourse and 
deliberation who "reject an antagonistic, conflictiial, zero-sum form of da 'wa and debate in 
favor of something more collaborative and open-minded".13 With reference to women's 
dress, there is a divergence over understanding texts and customs among Muslim 
minorities. One also has to be aware of the fact that even if we were able to identify* 
family as following y doctrine of Islam, this does not imply, in any case, that the third 
generation is respecting what their families do. Religiosity gets, necessarily, influenced by 
education, generational conflicts and social conditions. On the ground, the majority of third 
generation individuals, as showed by sociological studies, do not practice Islam. A recent 
study shows that only 33% declare to be believing and practicing Islam.14 
Being exposed to different Islamic interpretations, the third generation has access, in 
free societies, to an open market of Islamic interpretations. Fragmentation goes 
exponentially and imams, all categories, find it hard to communicate with and keep the 
third generation under control. With regard to the veil, it is to be noted that it is a practice 
that concerns only a minority of women (8% of women under the age of 35 wear it 
regularly).'5 What seems to be striking among the third generation young women is that 
they develop an increasing inclination to argue and to protest for their rights to put the veil 
in the public space. 
To face growing protest, right wing politicians and ideologues banned the integral veil, 
using two main arguments: security and dignity. Such a line of reasoning, obviously, 
replaces the argument of secularism. First, they argue that the veil is, chiefly, an obstacle of 
visibility and therefore a probable threat to public order. Second, taking into account the 
dignity of women it is not acceptable that a woman is "hidden" in a similar manner. While 
such a discourse has some truth in it, it should be said that, it covers the face of the problem 
as well. The partisans of banning visible religious signs reveal the intense contradictions of 
Western European societies. On the one hand, secularism is not recalled by the integral veil 
antagonists in the discussion since it does not concern the way people should dress in 
public places. On the other hand, laws that ban the integral veil in public places do not 
specify whose security they are protecting, presumably not that of the people living in the 
suburbs. 
In practice, then, the veil is pushed to stay behind the wall while it is meant to be a 
rejection of the wall. Both wearing the veil and banning it strengthen the leaps between the 
suburbs and Western European societies. What many Western Europeans do not want to 
see is the very reality of these young women who turn out to be, provocatively, visible by 
wearing the veil. Indeed, in the behavior of third generation young women, there is a 
marked sense of injustice that they displaced into a headscarf. I would not agree to make a 
comparison, like Anver Emon did, between the immigrant Muslim woman in France and 
the dhimmT in Islamic law, but he is not wide of the mark when he sees in the immigrant 
Muslim woman "the challenge of accommodating minorities amidst a universal, albeit 
13 March, Andrew F., Islam and Liberal Citizenship: the Search for an Overlapping Consensus, 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 225. 
14 Fourquet, Jérôme, Enquête sur l'implantation et l'évolution de l'Islam de France 1989-2009, IFOP, 
Paris, Août 2009, p. 7. 
15 Fourquet, Jérôme, Op. cit., p. 17. 
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ambiguous, claim of French core values".16 Interestingly enough, Muslim women and their 
defenders used the argument of secularism of Western European societies to claim 
neutrality of state with regard to their dress. That being the case, one can assert that, 
regardless of the outcome of deliberation, Muslim minorities came to discuss a legal matter 
(in Islamic law) with non-Islamic opponents, in a non-Islamic public space with arguments 
that they borrowed from the same space. Likewise, recent researches on public intervention 
of British Muslims with reference to 9/11 show how Muslims manage to access the British 
"dialogical network". They did so by expressing their reaction in the same or similar 
utterances of "a performative discourse that inscribes them in the inclusive category of 
those who condemn the terrorist attacks".17 
At any rate, let us not forget that the veil is a sign of a complex religiosity practiced in a 
given social environment. It is a part of a religious subculture: Muslim food, Muslim dress, 
Muslim music...etc. In short, Muslim subculture of suburbs synthesizes whatever is meant 
to be a sign of distinction and protest again the Western "culture". Recently, A. Caeiro 
argued for "a complex deliberative process that underlies the European Council for Fatwa 
and Research (ECFR)".18 Further, he described the project of ECFR as being an attempt at 
"imaging an Islamic counter-public".19 To be precise, ECFR, an organ of jurists that claim 
to represent Muslim legal authorities in Western Europe, takes on shaping an imagined 
Islamic counter-public. However, ECFR has to accept its extremely limited role in the 
European Muslim religious field let apart determining the counter-public of Muslim 
immigrant communities. My claim is that a given subculture (in our case it is a double 
subculture nourished by both Western and Islamic elements) always develops as a 
counterculture of a given social group that contests the dominant culture. The latter does 
not accept offending its norms and wants uniformity. Subcultures find, at the end, their 
place as part of the dominant culture only when social integration is achieved. 
16 Emon, Anver M., "Pluralizing Religion: Islamic Law and the Anxiety of Reasoned Deliberation ", 
In: After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engagement, Eds. Courtney Bender, Pamela E. Klassen, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 75. 
17 Ferrié, J.-N., Dupret, B., Legrand, V., "Comprendre la délibération parlementaire: une approche 
praxéologique de la politique en action", Rewe française de science politique. Vol. 58, No. 5, 2008, 
p. 810. 
Caeiro, Alexandre, "The Power of European Fatwas: the Minority Fiqh project and the making of 
an Islamic Counteipublic", International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2010, p. 
435. 
19 Ibid., p. 437. 
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Conclusion 
In this article, I tried to briefly show that dynamics of fragmentation and secularism 
intervene, effectively, in shaping the Muslim religious field in Western Europe. As a result, 
authorities are atomized which allows a divergence of religious standpoints and a 
multiplicity of voices over religious questions. Subsequently, 1 highlighted the social 
character of Muslim communities' participation in the public space through the example of 
the headscarf debate. The latter also illustrates the deliberative assets, so to speak, of 
Muslim authorities and individuals in negotiating their integration with Western European 
societies. 
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